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3. The Shaking of the Foundations
Abstract

The internal reactions of our ideas and feelings, while less obvious, are of even greater significance than the
changes which have occurred in our institutions. So great have these internal changes been that one writer has
described them as the shaking of the foundations. This characterization reminds is of what has been of major
importance to Western man: his ideas and ideals. Throughout his history it has been these ideas which have
supplied both his standards and his motivations, whether they referred to something beyond nature as
Augustine's City of God, something beyond the present as More's Utopia, something within nature as Stoic
law, or something like Bentham's greatest happiness principle. It has been this search for an ideal and the desire
to bring it into being which have accounted for Western man's restlessness, his dissatisfaction with the present,
and his desire for something better. When we remember the role that such ideas have played in Western
Civilization, we have a better appreciation of what their upsetting entails for man today. [excerpt]
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This is a part of Section XIX: An Analysis of the Contemporary World's Search for Meaning. The
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From 1947 through 1969, all first-year Gettysburg College students took a two-semester course called
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goal of “introducing the student to the backgrounds of contemporary social problems through the major
concepts, ideals, hopes and motivations of western culture since the Middle Ages.”
Gettysburg College professors from the history, philosophy, and religion departments developed a textbook
for the course. The first edition, published in 1955, was called An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization and
Its Problems. A second edition, retitled Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, was published in 1958 and 1960.
It is this second edition that we include here. The copy we digitized is from the Gary T. Hawbaker ’66
Collection and the marginalia are his.
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The Shaking of the Foundations

ideas and .fg^lijiga^\7hlle less
o b v i o u s , a r e o f e ven greater significance.chanrres which
have occurred In o^ur
SO great have these internal
changes been that one v/rit^ has described them as ti^e shaking of
t h e f o u n d a t j j a j i s . . T h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n r e m i n d s u s r>
- f a a p p» r|
oTlaajorl^portance to Western rian- his ideas and ideals. Through
ouc his histofy~Tt~Eas been these ideas which have supplied both
his standards and his motivations, whether they referred to some
thing beyond nature as Augustine's City of God, something beyond
the present as More's Utopia, something within nature as Stoic
law, or something like Bentham's greatest happiness principle. It
has been this search for an ideal and the desire to bring it into
being which have accounted for Western man's restlessness, his
dissatisfaction with the present, and his desire for something
better. When we remember the role that such ideas have played in
Western Civilization, we have a better appreciation of what their
upsetting entails for man today.
The firSt and gost__important thing: to. nntp. ahmit, this clianp-e
the jinr.t
vp
Jgeen bent to his own will. In overthrov/ing the absolutist institutTclis of church and state he also overthrew the absolutist ideas
upon which these institutions claimed to be founded. The only
conclusion.J;ii£LjLJae would accept waa that
and depejQjagj3Lt.u3iL.Jjt^
anvthinr- a1p.p.
T3e^:s~were means for getting something done, and all argument for
their independent existence was referred to as rationalization.
By means of this argument the results of reason;weve no lonp.er
interpreted as ideas but as ideolop^ies.
~~—•
This, approach had serious results v/ith regard to the status
idaSsi; These results can be seen when we look cafefuliy at the ordinary vocabulary of our contemporary world, in
'which we—gan see the changes in the older words and the axopearanc"^
of new ones. "ln~plaCt:t of jraTional we are apt to v^sF~rati:onaITzecl \
or justified. In lieu of individual we might say individualist. |
ideal v/e substitute idealized. ^Rather than true we use truismr
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rather than real we say realized. Idea has become idea(l)ism.
Philosophy has become philosophy for life, and the
ar^ri
^has become peacg_of^riilnd. _ Personal has become personallstlc or
pergiSnkllzi'git!. I'm ifeanii^ of "character" has changed from
referring to strength to referring to Idlosyncracy. And In place
of ideals we are surrounded by isms held by card-carrying ists,
rather than by individuals. Clearly, if our ordinary language
be any Indicatlcn, the culture in which we find ourselves today
has undergone a tremendous change,
Y/Mle the ideas of both Instituti
vi drai ^ tg.n'l
to h^ye tlie.-.aJ;jLtus of ideologlf^p! i-r>day.^
yot a nigm'fi
cant difference between,them from, tlie,,J3Qint of view of the i"di-vldual. It is largely based on the difference in size and power
between the individual and the institutions with which he is con
fronted. These institutions have a status which, in historical
terms, is much more permanent than his. This difference plus the
difference in size and power enables the institutions to give
their ideas a permanence he cannot give his ov/n ideas. When these
institutions create a coherent system of such ideas we call the
result a myth. And this myth, backed by the techniques and
power of the institution, takes on v/hat looks to the individual
like a life of its own. While this is only partially ,true of the
smaller institutions, it is supremely true of the political
institutions2 "There v/ill always be an England."
-Ld Jtlia—past. Wer.tern man's ideas, whether the nniversals of
Ari,§tPt,1e _or the laws of lhLe„,,g^toics^ were interpretations of his
relations to natviice and society... In the Interests of the indivi
dual, the Enlightenment pulled these Ideas from their dominant
position. But the result of this has been to emasculate the
very things which had served as buffers between individual and
individual, betv/een individual and Institution, and betv/een
institution and institution. Since all ideas are now nothln^but
ideologies v/hich are the expres^ons of individuals or institutions,
there~~is noprotection to the individual such as they nncp TvFTered
or_ could nave'~offere5^ This"~means that there is a direct power
clash l3eivfeexi~in3ividuals and institutions which can be seen only
as a clash between two types of persons of greatly different size
and power. It is this situation which, the psychologist tells us,
accounts for the fact of tension today, a tension which is basically
contention.
Whether tJie—Ldeological myths are Imposed from the top, as
they axe^Jux..-^^
or creaTed by the people who volunTarilv
mal?:e them theiras they_.gi:e,„in other countries, is of supreme
i'^EPXltance when j,¥e._ara.
in
. This
difference enables us to dlscritninate
total itaoiian and democrafiF^colant^
both the strength and the
appeal Xso necessary wTt1i""S^^ard to the uncommitted countries
today) of the democratic countries that their citizens may freely
accept, criticize, or perhaps change the policies of their govern
ments. Herein, as Mill and many others have insisted, is to be
found the unique contribution of countries whose policies are so

-
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conatitutecl, and their iBiprovement on preceding types of govern
ment. This very capacity for change has been a valued safeguard
against revolution.
Dut Mill's ideas were expressed a century ago, v/hen times
and institutions v/ere different. The v/orld v/as then one of isolated
nations living in almost coraplete independence of one another.
This nineteenth century situation also assumed the willingness of
peoples to change aiany of their ideas. And it assumed a situation
in which certain raoral limitations on speal:ing and acting by
individuals and states were accepted by almost everyone. Today
the democratic states are faced with others which are rigidly
dogiiiatic, and v/hich refuse to accept the limitations of nineteenth
century morals. And here again we are up against a basic contem
porary problem radically stated: IIov/ does one deal with people and
institutions for whoiii there are nn TTi^oi . no rules, and for x.'hon
nc-cxzing serves
?hAiT
Rmd
rrhat they
oay and are valid only as Icag as thev suit the convenience of
tlie mcr=ientand'TlIo3r~cairTe"'~clIanged at aay time and for" any '
reaZJen: — — — — —
——
Ko matter how iinportant the -political dimension of this
problem is, the psvcholog'ical dimension is of at least equal
iiiipor1-ance. In both the position of the individual is very similar.
His problem is that of trying to find some firm ground on which
trn-~T^-yapfl
11 nnand their myths.
If ideas are but ideologies, then they are bxit the creations of
their respective x)olitical institutions, and nothing more. There
may be no question of what Western nan prefers, if he has a free
choice; but this is not the question at issue. The question here
is: i7hat basis can he have for his choice? 17hat reason can he
give? What value can he use as the standard for his choice?
Having accepted the idea that all ideas and ideals a^'e x'elative
to the purposes of individuals and institutions, contemporary man
is left in aii unstable position, in a pov/er situation, with no
basis on v/hich to ground the coKimitments which he is continually
called upon to make.
It is small
that thinkinp" is pushed to absui'd limits.
Tills—i-&-Tffeat- Gecr ge Cr'well (1903-105u) had in mind when, inliis"
(<4nimal Fariu-^ he described one of the principles of the new society
TOicii tlie^ pigs were settixig up ag 'TAII "aS^malsare ecual. but soiie
""animals are more equal than others.'' "if the v/ord "er^ual" haa.^io
refiiieirFl?r"'~5as4-a-^. tiien it is PO"Stiible'~Tor the""'DlgsT"in this case.,
to make it trip a,o.-aj!*y4hi-niz-J;Iiay wi r;]-. for their purposes.
This situation i/hich Orwell depicts is, in one I'espect, nothing
new for Wogtern ;nan. He has been making comparative judgments ever
since his
l^hat is new, amir's,dir,a11 y
hov/ever, is the status, of the_ standarusnjn^^ari^
thesg;iuclc:me"lif£s are'"'t6""b''e rn.-^.rlp
the fall of the Roman
Empire has the slate been wiped quite so clean of old established
values in such a short time. Tifestern standards have always had
more than individual, social, historical, or cultural status. They
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have had metaphysical or religious status, and their particular
historical manifestations have been judged as approxinatlons of
these absolute standards. Revelation and reason have been the
Bieans of knowing these higher Ideals. But nov/ neither of these
methods is generally accepted, at least in its earlier forn.
3c Western isian appeal's to be in a situation ?/here lie has not
only lost his old bearings, but also the raeans of achlovlng
new ones. Thus his idsjilxsaa, which up to nov/ had been positive
and creative, h£|s becoiae negative and critical. Tl^is reaction
can bo seen in the" Beat..„ilejiar,a.tl.OT) 4,.a..-4fee-.CnjJi£,d States.. thg?_
Anra-y Y.aun£L-IIgii liiJ^'I,and. and^_on3_more,,,^,penMratin:s.»,^^
ainonn- the„jcua'-ristentialists.
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